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This paper introduces a new transmission channel of banking crises where sizable cross-
border bank claims on foreign countries with high domestic crisis risk enable contagion
to the home economy. This asset-side channel opposes traditional views that see bank-
ing crises originating from either domestic credit booms or from cross-border borrowing.
I propose a combined model that predicts banking crises using both domestic and for-
eign factors. For developed economies, the channel is predictive of crises irrespective
of other types of capital flows, while it is entirely inactive for emerging economies. I
show that policy makers can significantly enhance current early warning models by
incorporating exposure-based risk from cross-border lending.
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I. Introduction
Over a decade ago, the Global Financial Crisis shook the world economy to its core. From
its epicenter in the United States it quickly spread around the globe. While the crisis saw
a major part of the developed world economy struggle with systemic banking crises and
subsequent political upheaval, a significant number of small open economies weathered the
storm with not much more than a scratch (Lane & Milesi-Ferretti, 2011). These nations
had to endure adverse effects due to the subsequent collapse in global trade and economic
activity, but a banking crisis itself never reached their domestic banking systems. In this
paper, I propose a new channel of international banking crisis transmission that explains
the resilience of these small open economies, and develop an early warning model that can
help policy makers to account for the systemic risk of banking crises from abroad that arises
through this channel. I present a combined model of domestic and exposure-based risk that
outperforms traditional approaches both in and out-of-sample.
In contrast to the existing and ample literature on banking crisis transmission, I em-
phasize a cross-border bank lending channel of contagion that works from banks in countries
borrowing money to the banking system in a country that lends to these banks.1 When
a banking crisis unfolds in a foreign economy to which the home banking system has lent
significantly, foreign banks may default on their loans and thus bring home banks into jeop-
ardy. This stands in opposition to the cross-border bank borrowing channel a´ la Kaminsky &
Reinhart (2000), Schnabl (2012), and Bruno & Shin (2015), in which banking crises spread
from lending countries to recipient countries through a devaluation of the home currency in
case the debt is foreign-denominated or through a negative credit supply shock from abroad.
1 Importantly, I confine my analysis to the question of banking crisis incidence. Economies that have no
exposure to the proposed channel of crisis propagation may still be affected in the aftermath of a banking
crisis abroad when the real side of the economy is affected, and trade and foreign demand are inhibited.
This secondary transmission channel is not subject of my study. I am purely interested in how countries are
”infected” with banking crises from abroad, which have first-round adverse economic effects on the home
economy. Second-round effects may occur additionally when trade with the infecting country collapses
due to the banking crisis there.
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Recently, the borrowing channel has been put into question by Karolyi et al. (2018) who
find that heightened bank flows are actually associated with improved financial stability in
a recipient country’s banking system.
Another strand in the literature considers domestic causes of financial instability and
sees banking crises as the result of Minskyan domestic boom-bust dynamics. Schularick &
Taylor (2012) among many others have convincingly shown that banking crises are often
triggered by credit booms gone bust. The pattern of crisis incidence of the Global Financial
Crisis, however, poses a puzzle: Countries without domestic credit booms—like Germany
or Switzerland—experienced banking crises, while highly leveraged and capital-importing
economies such as Australia or Canada did not. These observations can neither be explained
by Minskyan dynamics nor by a bank borrowing channel. This open flank of the financial
stability literature is further accentuated by the fact that the role of net financial flows is
not clear in explaining banking crises: The current account balance is an ambiguous crisis
predictor (Frankel & Saravelos, 2012; Kauko, 2014). In this study, I resolve the puzzle
through the introduction of the cross-border bank lending channel, and I further shed light
on the role of the current account.
To show how the asset-side exposure to a foreign banking system functions as a channel
of contagion, I develop a model that combines domestic risk of banking crisis with exposure-
based risk. The domestic model uses standard multivariate logistic regressions with a binary
banking crisis classifier as dependent variable and a set of macro-financial indicators as
independent variables. The exposure-based model employs a weighted sum of domestic crisis
probabilities in foreign countries on which the home economy has bank claims. As weights, I
use the volume of the home country’s cross-border asset-side exposure in relation to the size
of its economy. The estimated crisis probabilities are measured against a threshold value
that minimizes a loss function which considers the policy maker’s preference for type I over
type II errors (Detken et al., 2014). Whenever the threshold is breached a warning signal is
issued.
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I find that economies with low domestic financial risk still experienced banking crises
at home if their banking system had accumulated large claims (in terms of GDP) towards
banks in countries with high domestic risk. Conversely, some small open economies with
elevated domestic instability demonstrated resilience because their banking systems had not
lent heavily to banks in other high-risk countries. Combining both approaches significantly
enhances the predictive ability of a model that considers domestic risks alone and show-
cases the significance of cross-border bank lending as a mechanism of crisis transmission.
The combined system is tested in a recursive out-of-sample setting and outperforms both
individual models.
To the best of my knowledge, this study is the first to propose an asset-side channel
of banking crisis transmission and reverse the direction of the liability-side channel that
has been prevalent in the literature. Methodologically, I build on the pioneering work of
Lang (2018) who recently introduced exposure-weighted foreign variables into a multivariate
logistic regression model set-up. The contributions of this paper are highly relevant for policy
makers as the combined model laid out here significantly enhances their monitoring abilities
of systemic risk built-up by factoring in domestic risks abroad and weighing it with their
home banking system’s asset-side exposure to these risks.
Relatively few studies have previously integrated financial linkages into an early warning
setting. Rose & Spiegel (2010) model both national and international causes of the Global
Financial Crisis within a multiple indicator multiple cause model. The international aspect
is characterized by a real channel that consists of trade linkages and by a financial channel
that reflects exposure to U.S. (or other high-risk countries’) assets. The authors find little
evidence, however, that either of the international factors matter in predicting the difference
in crisis incidence. Minoiu et al. (2015), on the other hand, find that financial interconnect-
edness is a useful early warning indicator. The authors employ a classifications algorithm on
network connectedness measures to predict systemic banking crises. They find that a coun-
try’s own higher connectedness and lower connectivity among its direct financial partners
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both predict higher crisis probabilities. A binary regression model that includes connectivity
measures outperforms a model that uses domestic macroeconomic factors alone. Aldasoro
et al. (2018) add a total cross-border claims-to-GDP ratio to a set of credit and asset price
indicators and find that it improves the predictive capabilities of a standard early warning
model of banking crises. The ratio’s predictive power intensifies the closer the forecasting
horizon is set to the crisis event. The cross-border claims fare better than foreign-currency
debt as ab indicator which underlines the importance of considering the role of international
lending as opposed to international borrowing in propagating banking crises.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. The upcoming section describes
the proposed transmission channel in detail and presents supporting stylized facts. Section
three discusses the data set and explains the methodology. Section four presents the main
results, both in-sample and out-of-sample. In section five, I discuss crisis incidence and the
role of cross-border bank lending during the Global Financial Crisis. I conclude and offer
policy advice in section six.
II. Cross-border bank lending and banking crises
Banking crises generally arise from two different origins: economic and financial imbalances
in the domestic economy, or disturbances abroad that are transmitted to the home economy.
I refer to the latter channel broadly as contagion or the international transmission of banking
crises. In their seminal study, Kaminsky & Reinhart (2000) distinguish between two types of
linkages with two different channels each, through which financial crises can transmit from
abroad to the home economy.2 Figure 1 summarizes the taxonomy of transmission channels
and places the new lending channel (marked in light grey) within that framework.
First, trade linkages between countries facilitate the propagation of shocks either through
2 I distinguish between a financial crisis and a banking crisis in so far as that the latter is a sub-category
of the former. I follow Claessens & Kose (2013) and distinguish between banking crises, currency crises,
sudden stops, and debt crises. Importantly, I do not discuss the incidence of currency crises in this paper
as long as they do not coincide with a banking crises (twin crises).
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bilateral trade exposure or through competition in a common third market. Direct bilateral
trade links matter in terms of contagion especially after a crisis unfolded in the foreign
economy. The consequential downturn in economic activity abroad depresses demand for
export goods at home and weakens the domestic real economy to the extend that it might
bring banks at home in danger, potentially triggering a banking crisis at home. The second
channel involves competition between the foreign and home country in a common third
country and is based on a story of competitive devaluation. In case a banking crisis develops
in the foreign economy its currency will devalue making its goods cheaper vis-a`-vis the third
country. The home country, which competes with the foreign economy in exports for the same
good to the third country, may choose to devalue its own currency to remain competitive.
This devaluation may bring banks at home into jeopardy that previously had borrowed
heavily in foreign currency as they will find it much harder to repay their outstanding debts,
potentially triggering a domestic banking crisis.
Second, less well-studied financial linkages enable the transmission of crises either through
bilateral cross-border bank flows or through global portfolio effects. The currency crisis liter-
ature has long emphasized a channel of contagion through bilateral cross-border flows from
a foreign country lending significant funds denominated in the foreign currency to the home
economy (Kaminsky & Reinhart, 1999). More recently, Schnabl (2012) and Bruno & Shin
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(2015) have confirmed contagion from a foreign, lending economy to a domestic, borrowing
banking system as the direction of effect. Karolyi et al. (2018), however, revisit this channel
and find that sizable flows from foreign to home banks actually increase financial stability in
the recipient country. In this study, I reverse the direction of the bilateral cross-border flow
channel and hypothesize a bank lending channel through which banking crises are trans-
mitted from a foreign, borrowing economy to the domestic, lending economy. The global
portfolio channel, lastly, refers to the exchange of non-bank financial assets across borders.
While a foreign country experiencing a banking crisis will likely be affected by massive sales
of its financial assets due to its deteriorating economic prospects, third-party international
investors may be liquidity-constrained such that they may be unable to sell foreign assets
at a price sufficient for meeting their cash flow requirements and may thus be forced to sell
assets of the home economy, which they hold on their balance sheets, to free up cash. This
will depress prices at home and could lead to a significant weakening of domestic banks’
balance sheets, increasing the probability of a banking crisis at home.
Figure 2: The cross-border bank lending channel
Foreign banksDomestic banks
Direction of transmission
Cross-border lending / holding foreign assets
In this study, I focus narrowly on the cross-border bank channel and specifically in-
troduce an asset-side view of cross-border bank lending to the well-developed literature on
contagion that focuses entirely on (foreign-denominated) cross-border bank borrowing (from
the perspective of the infected or home country). It is important to note that, from an
accounting perspective, outstanding loans to abroad on a domestic bank’s balance sheet are
equivalent to holding liabilities of foreign banks, such as mortgage backed securities, at home
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or maintaining deposits at banks abroad—they all show up as positions on the asset-side
of the domestic bank owed to a foreign entity. This is why I occasionally refer to the bank
lending channel more generally as the asset-side channel of cross-border banking. Figure 2
illustrates the channel and the direction of ts effect.
Theoretically, the cross-border bank lending channel can be decomposed into three sub-
channels which each explain a distinct process of how a banking crisis can be triggered in
the home country when a foreign economy, to which the home country has lent heavily,
experiences a banking crisis itself. First, a banking crisis in the foreign economy could cause
foreign banks to go bankrupt which then would default on their international liabilities,
bringing the banks in the home economy into jeopardy and potentially triggering a banking
crisis at home. Second, foreign banks may remain solvent but find themselves unable to
access liquidity because of a banking panic or general loss in confidence. The foreign banks
may find it difficult to acquire the liquidity to pay back the loans they owe to the home
country’s banking system thereby inducing financial instability at home. Third, depressed
real economic activity abroad resulting from a banking crisis (i.e. second-round effect) low-
ers the demand for credit in the home economy which previously had lent heavily to the
now adversely affected foreign economy. This could endanger home banks’ profitability and
increase the probability of banking crisis at home.
While the Global Financial Crisis of the last decade wreaked economic havoc around
the globe, there were important differences in crisis incidence among developed and emerg-
ing economies as well as between them (Rose & Spiegel, 2011; Lane & Milesi-Ferretti, 2011;
Berkmen et al., 2012). A closer look at the developments following the crisis reveals that
some countries fared remarkably well despite the sudden halt in global trade and the severe
disruptions in international financial markets. Australia, Canada, Chile, the Czech Repub-
lic, Israel, New Zealand, and Poland were among these resilient economies which did not
experience systemic banking crises at home and also exhibited considerably lower output
losses. Contrarily, the U.S. subprime crisis triggered systemic banking crises in Denmark,
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Germany, Hungary, Norway, Spain, Sweden, and Switzerland, among others.3
The Minsky-Kindleberger-Fisher boom-bust narrative (Minsky, 2008; Kindleberger &
Aliber, 2015; Fisher, 1933) has been prevalent in the discussion of the Global Financial Crisis
(e.g. Schularick & Taylor, 2012; Eggertsson & Krugman, 2012; Brunnermeier & Sannikov,
2014) but cannot sufficiently explain the observed crisis incidence. Countries like Australia
and Canada were domestically highly leveraged, exhibited house price hikes but did not
experience banking crises, while unleveraged economies with flat property price developments
like Switzerland and Germany suffered from systemic bank failures and saw government-led
bailouts. I address this deficiency by augmenting the story of domestic built-up of imbalances
by an approach that incorporates the transmission of systemic risk from abroad. Figure
3 illustrates this exposure-based view by depicting bilateral cross-border bank claims in
relation to GDP among several important economies at the onset of the recent crisis in the




where bank claimsji are the bank claims of home country i on the foreign economy j.
4 This
exposure measure is then divided by the home country’s GDP. In short, the figure dis-
plays a home economy’s cross-border exposure against foreign countries in relation to its
GDP. During the estimation process of the exposure-based model the weights are then fur-
ther multiplied by the foreign countries’ estimated domestic crisis probability to retrieve an
exposure-based index of foreign-induced risk of financial instability. Grey fields in the figure
indicate the non-availability of data.
The central role of London as a center of global finance is immediately visible from the
prominent position of Great Britain as a counterparty with which many economies main-
3 A structured approach to dating and identifying historical banking crises is discussed in the next section.
4 As is described in more detail in the following section, these bank claims of country i are often approx-
imated through the liability-side of counterparty countries {1, ..., J} as not all countries in the sample
report their cross-border exposures.
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tain high levels of cross-border exposure. This exposure can take various, such as loans to,
deposits at, or financial assets emitted by British banks. Switzerland, the Netherlands, Ire-
land, and—to a lesser extend—Belgium and Norway exhibit high levels of exposure to Great
Britain. All these nations were subsequently hit by domestic banking crises. Paradoxically,
the direct exposure of these countries to the United States did not seemed to have mattered
as much. The exposure of Great Britain, in turn, to the United States was substantial. This
stylized fact gives a first impression of how the crisis may have spread from the United States
to the British Banking System and from there to various developed economies in relative
close geographical proximity. On the other hand, countries like Canada, Australia, Israel, or
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New Zealand were not exposed to British assets and—due to the resulting unimportance of
the asset-side transmission channel—did not experience banking crises at home, either.
Irrespective of to their domestic macro-financial conditions some countries effectively
were financial islands in the storm that was the recent crisis, because they maintained no
significant exposures to the U.S. subprime market or to third countries that themselves had
significant exposures and turned out to developed their own banking crises.5 In the following
section, I propose a methodology to combine the domestic risk of banking crisis with the
exposure-based risk of being subject to destabilizing spill-over effects from abroad.
III. Methodology and data
My general idea to show that the cross-border bank lending channel matters for the trans-
mission of banking crises is to factor in exposure-based risk into a model that otherwise
only considers domestic imbalances as a source of financial instability. I expect this com-
bined model to clearly outperform a purely domestic one in predicting banking crises as it
additionally considers the risk of instability that stems from abroad. Taken to the historical
data, the combined model should further be able to predict the incidence of banking crises
in individual countries during the recent global crisis period out-of-sample.
I compute three distinct models: A domestic model (DM), an exposure-based model
(EM), and a combined model (DEM). The general approach of all three models closely follows
the established early-warning literature.6 This proximity is important since the model can
be useful for policy makers wishing to enhance current approaches to predicting banking
crises. All three models produce probability estimates and a corresponding threshold value
that emits a warning signal of imminent crisis when it is breached. The DM uses standard
5 It is interesting to note that many of the developed economies that proved resilient are those that have a
consistent and long history of remarkable financial stability. The question whether the asset-side channel
could also be helpful in explaining why banking systems in Canada, New Zealand, or Australia were
historically largely resistant to contagion I leave for future research.
6 Frankel & Saravelos (2012) and Kauko (2014) provide excellent literature overviews and comprehensive
reviews of the predictive power of various banking crisis indicators.
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Table 1: Data availability and crisis observations
Country Size Type Indicator Data LBS data Banking crises
Small Large Emerg. Dev. Start Start Start End
Australia X X 1974q1 1977q4 1990q1 1992q1
Austria X X 2003q1 1977q4 2008q3 2011q4
Belgium X X 1995q1 1977q4 2008q3 2009q4
Brazil X X 2004q1 1996q1 1985q3 1986q4
1994q3 1997q4
Canada X X 1973q1 1977q4 1982q3 1985q4
Chile X X 2005q1 1983q1 1975q2 1977q4
1981q3 1984q4
China X X 2008q2 1985q4 1998q1 1998q4
Czech Republic X X 2011q1 1993q4 1994q2 1999q1
2000q2 2001q4
Denmark X X 1993q1 1977q4 1992q2 1995q1
2008q3 2013q4
Finland X X 1975q1 1977q4 1991q3 1994q2
France X X 1995q1 1977q4 1991q3 1995q1
2008q3 2009q4
Germany X X 1973q1 1977q4 2008q3 2010q2
Great Britain X X 1977q4 1977q4 1973q1 1975q4
1991q3 1994q2
2008q3 2011q4
Greece X X 2013q1 1977q4 2011q3 2014q4
Hungary X X 2010q4 1977q4 1991q1 1995q4
1997q1 1997q4
2008q3 2010q3
Ireland X X 1990q1 1977q4 2008q3 2009q4
2010q4 2012q4
Israel X X 1997q1 1990q4 1983q4 1985q4
Italy X X 1988q1 1977q4 1991q3 1995q1
2011q3 2013q4
2016q1 2019q4
Japan X X 1985q1 1977q4 1990q3 1996q4
1997q4 2000q4
2001q2 2005q2
Mexico X X 2008q1 1980q4 1982q3 1982q4
1994q4 1997q4
Netherlands X X 1982q1 1977q4 2008q3 2009q2
New Zealand X X 1987q1 1977q4 1988q3 1990q4
Norway X X 1994q3 1977q4 1991q4 1994q2
2008q3 2009q4
Poland X X 2013q1 1992q1 1992q1 1996q4
Portugal X X 2013q1 1977q4 2008q3 2012q4
Russia X X 2004q1 1995q2 1995q3 1995q4
1998q3 1999q4
2008q3 2009q4
South Africa X X 1969q1 1977q4
South Korea X X 1984q1 1977q4 1997q4 1998q4
Spain X X 1990q1 1977q4 1978q1 1981q4
2008q3 2012q4
Sweden X X 1982q1 1977q4 1992q3 1997q2
2008q3 2009q2
Switzerland X X 1973q1 1977q4 1992q3 1997q2
2008q3 2009q2
Turkey X X 2013q1 1986q1 1983q4 1984q4
1994q2 1994q4
2000q4 2001q4
United States X X 1973q1 1977q4 1984q1 1986q4
1991q1 1992q2
2007q3 2010q4
Notes: The start date for indicator data refers to the first date for which all indicators are available for
model estimation. The start date for LBS data refers to the first data for which either LBS asset-side
data is available or for which asset-side data can be proxied by liability data of reporting counterparties.
Emerg. refers to emerging economy. Dev. refers to developed economy.
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multivariate logistic regressions with a binary banking crisis classifier as dependent variable
and a set of macro-financial indicators as independent variables. The EM employs the GDP-
weighted sum of domestic crisis probabilities in foreign countries on which the home economy
has bank claims. Effectively, the EM measures a home country’s exposure to risk of banking
crisis in foreign countries based on the size of claims the home country’s banking system
maintains with these foreign countries. The home country’s exposure to each foreign country
is then multiplied by the foreign country’s own estimated domestic crisis probability. Lastly,
The DEM includes the weighted foreign risk measure into the logistic regression equation
of the DM. The estimated crisis probabilities of all models are measured against respective
threshold values that minimize a loss function which considers the policy maker’s preference
for type I over type II errors. Whenever a threshold is breached a warning signal is issued.
The dataset consists of two components: first, an unbalanced panel of national macro-
financial variables and banking crisis observations, and second, a network of cross-border
bank assets and liabilities. The data have quarterly frequency and coverage begins in the
1970s for major countries and ends with the second quarter of 2019. Table 1 gives a compre-
hensive overview of data availability and banking crisis dates. The national macro-financial
variables come from the OECD and the BIS. Banking crisis dates are determined by a struc-
tural and quantitative approach based on bank stock price data, as discussed in the following
section. The cross-border banking data is calculated from the Locational Banking Statistics
(LBS) published by the BIS. Unfortunately, not all nations report their asset-side cross-
border exposure to the LBS. For countries which do not, the exposure is approximated by
the liability-side of their counterparties that do report.
The total panel includes 33 countries. To ensure data availability and quality at quar-
terly frequency, all nations are either members, accession candidates, or key partners of the
OECD and report their national data to the organization. Selecting the countries poses
a challenge as the results of this study shall be generalizable. I, thus, aim to include all
major developed economies and further all nations large enough to function as key influen-
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tial players either globally or locally (i.e. the United States, Japan, and China). A second
consideration is to balance developed with emerging economies, larger with smaller nations,
and account for geographical variation, as well. Nations I would have liked to include but
for which I had difficulties to obtain correct data at a high enough frequency were Hong
Kong and Singapore (regional financial centers); Iceland (highly exposed prior to the recent
crisis); and Colombia and Argentina (virtually unaffected by the Global Finanical Crisis).
I categorize economies as large if their population exceeds 50 million, and as small
otherwise. I am interested in investigating whether the impact of the cross-border bank
lending channel on financial instability differs from smaller countries to larger ones. It
is conceivable that smaller economies may face a bigger threat from foreign exposure as
their financial systems might quickly outgrow the size of their domestic economies like in
Iceland, Ireland, Switzerland, or Luxembourg. Conversely, larger economies are more likely
to have a high number of internationally active banks which would increase their cross-
border exposure in relation to smaller, non-international banking systems. I further define
two country subsets of emerging and developed economies for which I use the classification
of major finance company MSCI that is common in financial market practice.7 Since the
currency crisis literature has long stressed—what I call—the cross-border bank borrowing
channel of crisis transmission, i.e. through the exposure to foreign(-denominated) liabilities,
I investigate whether the asset-side (or lending) channel also applies to emerging economies
or is rather a phenomenon of more developed economies. I estimate all models separately
for the four country subsets and once for the entire sample.
7 https://www.msci.com/market-classification, accessed January 2020. Israel was moved into the
developed economy category in 2010. Classifying Israel for the purpose of this paper instead as an
emerging economy reduces the size of the standard errors for the emerging market subset somewhat but
does not alter the general results—neither in terms of sign or of significance of the estimated coefficients.
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Dating banking crises
A binary dummy serves as the independent variable of all three models and is set to one
whenever a systemic banking crisis is ongoing in a specific country at a specific point in time,
and to zero otherwise. The identification and dating of banking crises is no easy matter and
lively discussions have revolved around the correct methodology. Thus, several competing
databases exist (Demirgu¨c¸-Kunt & Detragiache, 1998; Kaminsky & Reinhart, 1999; Bordo
et al., 2001; Reinhart & Rogoff, 2009; Jorda` et al., 2017; Lo Duca et al., 2017; Romer &
Romer, 2017; Laeven & Valencia, 2018). Recently, Baron et al. (2020) have proposed a
promising method to consolidate and restructure these often narrative-based approaches
and introduced a novel dataset of historical bank stock prices for 46 countries over the past
150 years to date periods of bank distress. Whenever a country’s bank stock index drops
by at least 30 percent the event is considered, and the literature is systemically scanned for
evidence of widespread bank failures and panics, i.e. bank runs or heavy disturbances in the
interbank market. With this approach the authors are able to detect previously unknown
crisis episodes, confirm well-known events, and discard several spurious crises that were
prominent in the literature but otherwise left little evidence in the data. Based on Baron
et al. (2020), Baron & Dieckelmann (2020) build a comprehensive database of banking crises
that extends the current dataset by adding post-crisis GDP, bank credit, and public debt
measures; by quantifying policy responses, such as liquidity provision, bank holidays, liability
guarantees, or bank nationalizations; and by providing narrative summaries for more than
150 bank distress events.
In this study, I build on the advanced crisis dating methodology of the forthcoming
database. Specifically, I employ a three-step process to identify periods of significant bank
distress and date the quarter of their beginning and end. First, I select all events from
the database that are identified to have exhibited widespread bank failures. Widespread,
hereby, is defined as either more than five banks or at least one major bank. Second, I choose
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the quarter in which a panic occurred as the starting date for these distress episodes. The
panic date refers to the month in which bank runs, the collapse of interbank markets, or
the failure of a systemic institution occurred. Not all periods of widespread bank failures
exhibit a panic. These episodes Baron et al. (2020) call ”quiet crises” because they are
often resolved without much knowledge of the public, but still can—as the authors show—
significantly impair economic activity. Third, if no panic is recorded, I resort to the excellent
databases of Laeven & Valencia (2018) and Lo Duca et al. (2017) as they offer precise dating
of the beginning, and in the latter case, of the end of distress periods. In the rare case that
the two sources do not agree with Baron & Dieckelmann’s (2020) dating method and do not
record dates for the respective events, I use the quarter in which the bank stock prices drop
by at least 30 percent as the starting date of the crisis. Table A.9 in the appendix illustrates
the result of the dating process in detail.
The domestic model
To predict the probability of a banking crisis resulting from domestic imbalances, I choose
a standard method—a pooled multivariate logistic regression model—from the tool set of
the early warning literature to ensure economic interpretatability and tractability. First, I
define a baseline model of the form
logit(pid) = ln
pid
1− pid = β0 + β1X +  (1)
where pid is the probability of occurrence of a banking crisis within a certain range of upcom-
ing quarters, called pre-crisis horizon.8 X is a vector of independent variables. I evaluate the
estimated probability pid against a threshold value. If pid breaches that threshold a warning
signal is issued. For readability, time indexes are dropped from the notation above. The
pre-crisis horizon is set to a range of 3 to 12 quarters and is motivated by the stylized facts
8 Strictly speaking, I am not predicting crisis observations but pre-crisis periods. The idea here is to give
governments and monetary authorities sufficient time to react to an impending crisis.
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provided further below in Figure 4 where credit growth tends to peak between three to five
quarters before a crisis and house prices peak earlier at around eight to twelve quarters prior.
This range is also well in line with pre-crisis horizons set by Holopainen & Sarlin (2017, five
to twelve quarters) and Detken et al. (2014, four to twenty quarters).9
Bussiere & Fratzscher (2006) report the existence of a post-crisis bias when observations
enter the model estimation process at time points when crises are unfolding (crisis periods) or
being resolved (post-crisis periods). Including these observations can distort model results as
they present states of the economy where adjustment processes are taking place and macro-
financial indicators are thus severely distorted. I account for the post-crisis bias by dropping
crisis observations from the training data set. I ensure that crisis periods are dated in such
a way that a crisis is considered to be over only when the respective economy has re-entered
its normal state. I can thus forgo defining a special post-crisis horizon.
Table 2: Confusion matrix
Crisis No crisis
Signal True positive False positive (type I)
No signal False negative (type II) True negative
To assess the model’s predictive abilities, I define a confusion matrix as depicted in Table
2 where the occurrence of a crisis 3 to 12 quarters after a signal has been issued is counted as
a true positive; and as a false positive if no crisis follows. Equally, if no crisis occurs 3 to 12
quarters after no signal has been issued (the default) the count of true negatives is increased
by one. If, however, an unforeseen crisis ensues, a false negative is recorded. Whenever
the estimated crisis probability breaches a certain optimal threshold, a warning signal is
issued. Next, I construct a linear grid of n = 1000 evenly distributed possible threshold
values v ∈ [0, 1] and loop through all potential threshold values to find the one value that
9 Altering the pre-crisis horizon within four years prior to crisis events does not significantly alter the results
presented in the next section. It is important, however, to set the horizon long enough to account for the
lead peak of house and share prices over private credit. An upper bound of less than ten quarters has
proven to be insufficient.
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minimizes Alessi & Detken’s (2011) policy maker’s loss function of the form
L = φ
FN
TP + FN︸ ︷︷ ︸
type II error rate
+ (1− φ) FP
FP + TN︸ ︷︷ ︸
type I error rate
where TP and FP are the total number of true and false positives over the entire sample
given a certain threshold v, and TN and FN are the total number of true and false negatives,
respectively. The policy maker sets φ ∈ (0, 1) according to her preference for issuing a false
alarm over missing a crisis without an alarm. φ thus represents the model’s sensitivity to
issue a warning signal. A higher value of φ will result in a more conservative prediction result
that prefers a wrong signal over missing a crisis. The choice of the policy parameter influences
how low or high the threshold bar will be set. Whether a domestic crisis probability of pd
is tolerable or is a reason for concern ultimately depends on the policy maker’s risk aversion
and policy preference.
I collect five common macro-financial indicators as independent variables for the do-
mestic model that are endorsed by the literature: Total private credit to the non-financial
sector, the private debt-to-GDP ratio, residential property prices, stock prices, and the cur-
rent account-to-GDP ratio.10
Table 3: Independent variables
Indicator Transformation Source
Private credit to the nonfinancial sector 3-year real growth rate BIS
Private credit to the nonfinancial sector to-GDP ratio BIS
Residential property price index 3-year real growth rate BIS
Equity price index 3-year real growth rate OECD
Current account balance to-GDP ratio OECD
The independent variables receive several transformations that are motivated by stylized
facts and findings of other studies. According to a now rich literature, financial instability is
10 I have also used a larger set of indicators including inflation, policy rate, U.S. dollar exchange rate, and
government debt. The qualitative results of this study—especially with regard to the functioning of the
cross-border lending channel—remain unchanged, however.
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connected to medium-term cycles in private credit and asset prices whose peaks are closed
related to and predictive of financial crises (e.g. Borio & Lowe, 2002; Drehmann et al., 2012;
Aikman et al., 2015; Strohsal et al., 2015). It has thus become a standard approach in the
early warning literature to extract a medium-term deviation from trend from private credit
and asset prices to capture the built-up of macro-financial risk. Most commonly, the filtering
techniques proposed by Hodrick & Prescott (1997, HP) or Christiano & Fitzgerald (2003,
CF) are used for extraction of those deviations (e.g. Detken et al., 2014; Babecky´ et al.,
2014; Lang, 2018). Schu¨ler (2018) and Hamilton (2018) have recently criticized the use of
the HP filter because of its tendency to induce spurious cycles. Hamilton (2018) proposes a
regression of the variable on its four most recent values as a remedy. Other very common and
simple alternatives are moving averages or rolling growth rates over a window of several years
to capture the medium-term characteristics of the financial cycle (e.g. Schularick et al., 2016;
Dell’Ariccia et al., 2016; Aikman et al., 2017; Lang et al., 2019). For reasons of simplicity,
the baseline model in this study uses 3-year growth rates as the standard transformation for
private credit, house prices, and equity prices.11 Table 3 displays the list of indicators, their
baseline transformations, and their respective source.
Figure 4 displays event studies that show the mean and median development of the five
indicators 26 quarters prior to and after the start of a crisis event. The grey band repre-
sents 50% of total observations that lie within the lower and upper quartile (25th and 75th
percentiles) of the respective indicator across all countries and periods. All growth rates
are yearly and computed in real terms. The figure confirms established facts about macroe-
conomic developments around banking crises. Growth in private credit to the nonfinancial
sector increases steadily up until very close to the onset of the crisis. House and stock price
hikes precede banking crises. Also, house prices tend to peak on average five to six quarters
before the onset of the crisis which is in line with findings by Schudel (2015). Stock prices,
on the other hand, reach their height up to ten quarters prior to the beginning of a crisis.
11 For robustness, I also employ one-sided HP filters and the Hamilton (2018) procedure to extract the
medium-term component of these series. The general results, however, do not change substantially.
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Figure 4: Behavior of indicator variables around crisis observations
Private debt−to−GDP ratio Stock price growth
Current account−to−GDP ratio House price growth Private credit growth
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Note: This figure presents event studies of indicator variables 25 quarters before and
after the beginning of a banking crisis event. Shaded areas indicate range between
lower and upper quartile.
There is some indication that a worsening of the current account balance precedes crises
which I examine further in the following section.
The exposure-based model
Building on the baseline domestic model applied to foreign countries (FCs), the exposure-
based model captures the foreign-induced risk of banking crisis in a banking system abroad.
The following approach is influenced by the recent pioneering work of Lang (2018) but differs
in the way the foreign-induced risk is aggregated and ultimately combined with the domestic
model. I define the exposure-based model as











The exposure of a home country (HC) i is measured by the total outstanding bank claimsji
of its banking system against foreign countries divided by the HC’s GDP, as described in
section two. These cross-border exposure weights wji are then multiplied by the respective
domestic model probability pˆidj of those foreign economies Ci that are connected with the
HC i. These exposure-weighted crisis risk estimations are finally summed up for each HC
and divided by Ci. The resulting number represents a weighted risk index of foreign-induced
banking crises. This index is then plugged into a simple logistic regression model with a
constant term to ensure an output between 0 and 1.
The Locational Banking Statistics (LBS) contain data on outstanding assets and liabili-
ties of banks located in 47 reporting countries vis-a`-vis banks located in over 200 counterparty
countries. The LBS capture around 95% of cross-border banking activity worldwide.12 To
fully assess an HC’s risk stemming from financial linkages to banks in other countries, I
consider the total number of the HC’s bank claims (asset side) against these foreign coun-
tries. The underlying assumption, as described by Lang (2018) and outlined in the previous
section, is that an HC may find itself in a state of financial instability regardless of its
own domestic risk if it has lent heavily—i.e. holds foreign assets—in relation to the size
of its economy to banks in foreign countries experiencing a banking crisis, making them
prone to fall short of their debt obligations.13 Unfortunately not all countries report their
cross-border bank claims (assets) directly to the BIS. Thus, I have to rely on the reporting
countries’ liability side for these economies. If data coverage was complete and data quality
was perfect, a reporting country’s liability vis-a`-vis a country of interest should equal that
country’s claims (assets) vis-a`-vis the same reporting country. Naturally, this is currently
not the case. However, the patterns within the liability time series are consistent and, for the
purpose of this paper, reporting countries’ liabilities towards HCs must suffice as proxies for
12 https://www.bis.org/statistics/about_banking_stats.htm, accessed in January 2020.
13 It is important to note here that, unlike the currency crisis or sudden stop literature, I am not interested
in the inflow of capital into—or the lending to—the HC. These two processes represent another type of
transmission channel of financial instability, especially if the flows are suddenly reversed. Here, the focus is
on capturing foreign-induced banking crises and thus the HCs are modeled as lenders instead of borrowers
of international funds.
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cross-border financial linkages where asset-side data is not available. As we will see further
on, these approximations already yield highly informative results.







8.5% of IL GDP
5.7% of IL GDP
0.13%
of UK GDP
5.6% of UK GDP
42.6% of CH GDP
0.32%
of CH GDP
Note: The figure displays an excerpt of the cross-border network of bank claims. The
number inside the circles are predicted domestic crisis probabilities and the arrows rep-
resent the volume of cross-border bank claims (pointing towards the debtor) in relation
to the lending country’s GDP.
The model’s general idea is illustrated in Figure 5. The graph depicts a small segment
of the network of cross-border bank claims that involves the two smaller countries Israel
and Switzerland, and the large United Kingdom at the end of the first quarter of 2007.
The numbers inside the nodes correspond to the predicted crisis probability of the country’s
respective domestic model out-of-sample on the basis of training data up until the end of
2006.14 The labels adjacent to the edges indicate the amount of outstanding bank claims
in relation to GDP from the point of view of the lending country. The arrows point from
the lender to the borrower. It is immediately visible that Israel exhibits only a marginal
14 The depicted model is estimated separately for small and large economies. I discuss the results of the
estimation and evaluation process in the following section.
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probability of a domestically-induced banking crisis, Switzerland faces elevated risk, and the
United Kingdom is confronted with a 37% probability of imminent banking crisis over the
next 3 to 12 quarters. Unlike Israel, Switzerland has large exposure to the banking system of
the United Kingdom of almost 43% of its GDP and thus faces a much larger threat of foreign-
induced financial instability. Switzerland’s aggregated index of foreign-induced crisis risk for
the entire network will likely be much higher than Israel’s, and consequently the exposure-
based model would predict a higher probability of foreign-induced crisis for Switzerland than
for Israel. Since Israel is at the time of writing not reporting to the LBS, the assets and
liabilities of Israel vis-a`-vis Switzerland and the United Kingdom are not present in the
source data. Israel’s cross-border bank claims are proxied by the total bilateral liabilities
reported by Switzerland (5.7% of Israeli GDP) and the United Kingdom (8.5% of Israeli
GDP).
While the idea of an exposure-based early warning model originates from Lang (2018),
my implementation differs substantially in the way the individual weights are aggregated
as well as in how the domestic and exposure-based models are merged into a combined
model. Lang (2018) uses the weights to compute exposure-based independent variables that
are fed simultaneously with the domestic independent variables into a combined model. I
deliberately choose to issue two distinct crisis probabilities to be able to distinguish between
the impact of domestic and of foreign-induced crisis risk during the Global Financial Crisis.
The policy maker’s loss function and threshold optimization work exactly like described
above for the domestic model.
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The combined model
In a third step, the weighted risk index of foreign-induced banking crisis is plugged into the
domestic model. The combined model takes the form








crisis risk-weighted exposure index
+ (3)
and is estimated for small, large, emerging, developed, and all countries separately. In a
slight variation, I estimate a second model for each country set that contains an interaction
term between the current account balance and the foreign-induced risk index. Since the
current account balance signals whether a country is a net capital importer (deficit) or
exporter (surplus), it is related to the concept of cross-border bank flows which are one type
of international capital flows. The inclusion of the interaction term allows for distinguishing
the unconditional effect of the current account balance on financial instability from the effect
that is conditional on high exposure to foreign crisis risk. The literature has found at best
moderate evidence that a current account deficit, i.e. sustained foreign capital imports, is a
predictor of banking crisis (Kauko, 2014), which corresponds to the conventional view that
capital inflows can lead to financial instability. With the cross-border bank lending channel,
however, it is the exposure to foreign assets, not foreign liabilities, that drives up the risk of
banking crisis, and I would thus expect—by tendency—a current account surplus to precede
banking crises in case they are induced through foreign asset exposure. The interaction term
helps to test this hypothesis.
The comparison between the domestic and the combined model gives an indication on
whether the inclusion of banks’ cross-border asset-side exposure matters for the explanation
of financial instability in addition to the well-known domestic factors. An increase in the
predictive ability of the domestic model after including the foreign-induced risk index is
interpreted as evidence that the cross-border bank lending channel matters for financial in-
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stability and represents a hitherto missing puzzle piece in the macroeconomic understanding
of international crisis transmission.
Evaluation
I evaluate the models’ predictive abilities in-sample and out-of-sample. For the latter, I
run two exercises: First, I use cross-validation, for which the sample is randomly split into
equally sized parts, and where one part alternately functions as the testing data set while the
rest of the data is used to train the system. The accumulated performance measures are then
averaged over all runs. Second, I compute all three models recursively to corroborate the
recursive exercise. This means that for every successive quarter the entire model specification
is re-estimated on the basis of the observations that are available up until the respective point
in time. The accumulated predicted crisis probabilities are thus out-of-sample at the point
in time where the model was estimated. As a result, the optimal thresholds vary over time
as the grid optimization process is reiterated with every additional quarter.
The literature knows several informative tools to evaluate a model’s predictive abilities
(Candelon et al., 2012; Sarlin, 2013). In this paper, I use the popular Area Under the Receiver
Operator Curve (AUROC) to assess my models’ performance in-sample and out-of-sample.
The AUROC is closely related to the concepts of the confusion matrix and the policy maker’s
loss function introduced earlier. The Receiver Operator Curve (ROC) is a two-dimensional
graph that plots the sensitivity against the specificity for a range of considered threshold
values (in this case n = 1000). Sensitivity—or alternatively the true positive rate (TPR)—is
the ratio of the correctly signaled crisis events over all crisis observations; and specificity—or
alternatively the true negative rate (TNR)—is the fraction of correctly identified non-crisis
events in all non-crisis events. Formally,
Sensitivity = TPR =
TP
TP + FN
= 1− type II error rate,
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Specificity = TNR =
TN
TN + FP
= 1− type I error rate.
The ROC then plots all TPR-TNR combinations for the grid of considered threshold
values. Connecting these pairs results in a frontier curve that can be summarized in one
measure by computing the area underneath. The policy maker’s preference then takes the
form of indifference curves that are tangent to the frontier which results in different optimal
TPR-TNR value pairs and thus different optimal thresholds depending on the choice for the
preference parameter φ.15 The AUROC assumes values between 0 and 1, where a value of
.5 corresponds to a coin toss and every value higher than .5 indicates a predictive ability of
the classification system better than a random guess. The larger the AUROC, the better
the predictive ability of the model.
IV. Results
The estimation results of the domestic model presented in Table 4 hold no surprises and
are well in line with the literature, as expected. Private credit matters for the prediction of
financial instability for all country sets—be it as a growth rate or in the form of the debt
level. While credit growth seems to be the slightly more relevant indicator across all country
sets, it is only the level of private debt that is relevant for large economies. Asset valuations,
as represented by house and share prices, are strong predictors, as well, with the interesting
observation that for smaller economies house price growth is not statistically significant.
Evidence on the current account balance is mixed, which is mirrored well in the literature that
finds, at best, a moderate role for a current account deficit as a predictor of banking distress
(Kauko, 2014). For smaller economies, a current account surplus, i.e. sustained capital
exports, is predictive of banking distress at 5% confidence, while for emerging economies
a current account deficit matters, even if only at an 11.9% confidence level. The current
account coefficient estimates for the remaining country sets are not significantly different from
15 Detken et al. (2014) provide a very clear and intuitive explanation of the AUROC and its relation to the
policy maker’s loss function in section 2.2 of their paper.
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zero. I interpret the opposite sign directions as first evidence that my proposed distinction
of a cross-border banking channel of crisis transmission into an asset side and a liability side
meets evidence in the data. Cross-border claims of smaller nations with large banking sectors
quickly become large in relation to the size of their real economy and thus change the direction
of the economy’s current account, turning it into surplus. Contrarily, the negative sign and
the coefficients’ sufficiently high statistical significance confirm the established finding from
the currency crisis literature that sizable cross-border liabilities are predictive of banking
crises in emerging economies.
Table 4: Domestic model estimations
Variable Country Set
Small Large Emerging Developed All
(const.) −5.508∗∗∗ −4.837∗∗∗ −8.114∗∗∗ −3.836∗∗∗ −4.640∗∗∗
(0.465) (0.407) (1.376) (0.303) (0.266)
Private credit, 3-year real growth rate 3.860∗∗∗ 0.674 11.000∗∗∗ 1.098∗ 1.708∗∗∗
(0.768) (0.580) (2.107) (0.591) (0.441)
Private debt-to-GDP ratio 0.007∗∗∗ 0.013∗∗∗ −0.005 0.002 0.007∗∗∗
(0.002) (0.003) (0.008) (0.002) (0.001)
House prices, 3-year real growth rate −0.086 2.819∗∗∗ −5.559∗∗∗ 2.838∗∗∗ 1.738∗∗∗
(0.897) (0.614) (1.905) (0.621) (0.485)
Share prices, 3-year real growth rate 1.772∗∗∗ 0.796∗∗∗ 1.371∗∗∗ 1.418∗∗∗ 1.160∗∗∗
(0.230) (0.193) (0.411) (0.174) (0.138)
Current account-to-GDP ratio 0.048∗∗ −0.032 −0.112 −0.005 −0.006
(0.023) (0.030) (0.072) (0.018) (0.016)
Observations 1,515 1,331 716 2,130 2,741
Pseudo R2 0.695 0.541 0.902 0.501 0.610
AUROC 0.897 0.719 0.960 0.791 0.781
In-sample results
Threshold (φ = 0.5) 0.069 0.170 0.067 0.080 0.074
Sensitivity 0.840 0.469 1.000 0.773 0.682
Specificity 0.836 0.951 0.915 0.745 0.768
Threshold (φ = 0.8) 0.038 0.012 0.067 0.053 0.040
Sensitivity 0.968 1.000 1.000 0.878 0.891
Specificity 0.635 0.067 0.915 0.550 0.481
Notes: The table displays estimation results from a pooled logistic regression model for various country
sets. *, **, *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% confidence level, respectively. The Pseudo
R2 is computed following McFadden (1974). Sensitivity refers to the true positive rate (TPR), specificity
refers to the true negative rate (TNR).
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The optimal thresholds are computed for two different policy preference scenarios: in-
different (φ = 0.5) and conservative (φ = 0.8). Due to the high costs involved in missing an
actual crisis event, the latter can be seen as the more plausible in an applied setting. All five
model estimations exhibit at least satisfactory in-sample performance. Both McFadden’s
(1974) Pseudo R2 and the AUROC point to strong predictive abilities. While the proposed
domestic model yields good results for large and developed economies at AUROCs of 0.719
and 0.791, respectively, it performs exceptionally well for small and emerging economies with
values of 0.897 and 0.960. The pooled estimation has good predictive power at an AUROC
of 0.781, as well. These results are robust to different growth rate horizons or to whether the
medium-term component in credit and asset prices was computed via HP filter or Hamilton
procedure, as is shown in the appendix. I thus interpret the better fit of the model for smaller
and less developed economies such that their risk of financial instability largely stems from
domestic sources. I hypothesize that for larger and more developed economies there is a
greater role for the cross-border bank lending channel to induce financial instability. While I
expect the domestic model’s performance to improve for all country sets after the inclusion
of the exposure-based risk, I assume that the increase will be most significant for larger and
more developed economies, bringing AUROCs across the various country sets to higher, and
more uniform levels.
In an intermediate step, I estimate the exposure-based model for the same country sets
as above. Results are reported in Table 5. Using a logistic model with only the crisis risk-
weighted exposure index as an independent variable ensures that the prediction outcome will
be standardized between 0 and 1 and that it can, in this way, be compared to the output of the
domestic model. The model performs best for developed economies with an AUROC of 0.696,
which is only somewhat lower than the value for its domestic counterpart. I interpret this as
evidence that asset-side cross-border exposure is on equal footing with domestic imbalances
when explaining financial instability for developed nations. For emerging economies, on the
other hand, the crisis risk-weighted exposure index does not explain the incidence of banking
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Table 5: Exposure-based model
Variable Country Set
Small Large Emerging Developed All
(const.) −3.151∗∗∗ −3.284∗∗∗ −2.906∗∗∗ −3.094∗∗∗ −3.113∗∗∗
(0.101) (0.129) (0.135) (0.093) (0.076)
Crisis risk-weighted exposure index 0.233∗∗∗ 0.525∗∗∗ 0.072 0.273∗∗∗ 0.364∗∗∗
(0.021) (0.058) (0.125) (0.023) (0.028)
Observations 2,648 1,864 1,487 3,025 4,512
Pseudo R2 0.094 0.105 0.000 0.087 0.076
AUROC 0.643 0.609 0.358 0.696 0.628
In-sample results
Threshold (φ = 0.5) 0.064 0.064 0.053 0.067 0.060
Sensitivty 0.483 0.475 0.538 0.564 0.503
Specificity 0.825 0.820 0.586 0.791 0.762
Threshold (φ = 0.8) 0.042 0.001 0.052 0.001 0.043
Sensitivty 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000
Specificity 0.056 0.000 0.106 0.000 0.028
Notes: The table displays estimation results from a pooled logistic regression model for various country
sets. *, **, *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% confidence level, respectively. The
Pseudo R2 is computed following McFadden (1974). Sensitivity refers to the true positive rate (TPR),
specificity refers to the true negative rate (TNR).
crises and the AUROC consequently drops to 0.358. I conclude that the proposed asset-side
transmission channel does not work for economies with less developed banking systems. As
the currency crisis literature states, the international transmission of banking crises to these
countries works through the liability side of banks’ balance sheets, i.e. by borrowing from
abroad. Country size does not affect the lending channel. The country subsets for small
and large economies as well as the pooled set all exhibit similar moderate performances with
AUROCs above the critical threshold of 0.5, but with significant coefficient estimates with
positive signs for the exposure index, as expected.
Lastly, I investigate how well the combination of both sources of risk explains the in-
cidence of banking crises. The estimation results of the combined model are displayed in
Table 6. As expected, the overall in-sample performance improves in comparison to the
domestic model and a more uniform pattern of AUROC values emerges across all country












































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































instability and its inclusion improves the general prediction of banking crisis. How substan-
tial this improvement is, however, depends greatly on the level of development of the home
banking system and to a lesser extend on the size of the home economy.16 The inclusion of
the Crisis risk-weighted exposure index into the domestic model has the greatest effect for
large economies with the AUROC improving by 0.09 (no interaction) and 0.13 (with inter-
action) to 0.812 and 0.847, respectively. The combined model also improves domestic model
estimations reasonably well for developed economies (by 0.05 each) and the pooled country
set (by 0.06 each). This is in line with my previous findings that exposure-based risk from
the asset-side of banks’ balance sheets is increasingly predictive of financial instability the
higher the country’s banking system is developed. The pooled set shows similar predictive
abilities only because it predominately consists of developed economies. Importantly, and
confirming previous findings, the inclusion of the exposure index only adds marginally to the
predictive ability of the domestic model for emerging economies: The cross-border channel of
banking crisis transmission does not work through the asset-side for emerging economies.17
For small economies, the improvement is negligible, as well.
The coefficient estimates reveal several interesting patterns.18 First, there seems to be
a clear distinction in how residential property prices affect financial instability: While a
decline in real house prices predict crises in emerging economies, it is the other way around
for developed nations: here, house price hikes are related to banking crises. I conclude
that while the Minskyan asset boom-bust story applies well to developed nations, we must
consider less developed economies in a different light. I conjecture that it is rather episodes
16 In the appendix, I conduct a robustness test in which I estimate the exposure-based model interacting
the exposure index with the private credit-to-GDP ratio—as a proxy for financial development (King &
Levine, 1993; Ang, 2008). As Table A.10 shows, the exposure-index is increasingly predictive of banking
crises the higher a country is financially developed, confirming the above findings.
17 To corroborate this finding, I compute marginal effects for the combined model in the appendix to assess
the magnitude of the effect from including the exposure index into the domestic model. As Figure A.9
shows, its inclusion adds positively to the probability of banking crisis in all country sets except for
emerging economies, where the effect is absent and not statistically different from zero.
18 The standard errors of the coefficient estimates presented in the Table 6 do not account for within-country
correlation in the error term. Clustering the error terms on the country level, however, has no effect on
the interpretation of the results. This holds especially for the (non-)significance of the crisis-risk weighted
exposure index.
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of deflation and capital retrenchment resulting in collapsing house prices that precede crisis
in emerging economies, than bursting house price bubbles that trigger devaluations and fire
sale cycles.
Second, the significance of capital retrenchments in emerging economies is also visible
from the highly significant and negative coefficient estimate for the current account balance.
The exposure index does significantly increase financial instability but when I interact the
index with the current account its unconditional contribution becomes insignificant. It is
thus only when the current account is in surplus that the exposure index explains banking
crises. When the balance is in deficit the exposure does not matter for financial instability.
I explain this observation by assuming that, for emerging economies, other types of cross-
border capital flows must matter more than bank flows, which are the only type of flow that
are represented by the exposure index. Foreign direct investments or foreign portfolio flows
may be much more indicative of incumbent financial instability.
Third, while cross-border bank flows do not seem to affect the current account signif-
icantly in emerging economies, for small economies the picture looks different: While the
domestic model previously found that a current account surplus, i.e. sustained capital out-
flows, is indicative of financial distress, this effect disappears once I control for the exposure-
based risk and its interaction with the current account. The exposure index assumes the
significance that was previously (positively) attributed to the current account balance. This
means that cross-border bank claims have a tendency to become so large in relation to small
country’s GDP that they quickly determine the direction of the current account.
Fourth, the inclusion of the interaction term only really improves the predictive ability
of the domestic model for large economies, making the unconditional current account balance
coefficient highly significant again with a negative sign. This is in line with the argument
made previously that the inclusion of the cross-border bank lending channel yields the best
results for larger economies.
Fifth and last, the inclusion of the interaction term only changes results for emerging
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and large economies; all other country set estimations are virtually unaffected—be it with
regard to the models’ predictive ability or to the coefficient and standard error estimates. For
both types of economies the current account balance remains a separate indicator of financial
instability after controlling for the risk originating from cross-border bank claims. I already
concluded that the negative sign and the high significance of the current account estimate
most likely points towards the importance of the cross-border bank borrowing channel. For
large economies, the explanation is not immediately clear: Considering that the inclusion of
the interaction term makes the current account estimate significant (with a negative sign) and
keeps the unconditional exposure index estimate significant, I conclude that the cross-border
lending channel works regardless of the direction of the current account but is exacerbated
by sustained capital imports. The message here is, that even though a large country is an
overall net capital importer, sizable cross-border bank claims (which are capital exports) are
still a powerful mechanism to import banking crises from abroad, even if the bank claims are
small in comparison to other types of capital flows that are headed in the opposite direction.
The findings discussed above shed new light on why the current account balance so far
has been difficult to employ as an early-warning indicator of banking crises. Both directions
of the balance matter for financial instability: While emerging economies are more susceptible
to crisis spillovers when they run a sustained deficit, i.e. capital imports, developed countries
seem to have a tendency to expose themselves to foreign risk by sustained surpluses, i.e.
capital exports. Bank flows—as one form of cross-border capital flows—matter most for
smaller economies but can play a significant role in larger economies, too.
For the combined model, the indifferent policy scenario yields satisfactory detection
rates, i.e. sensitivity and specificity scores. The potentially preferable, conservative scenario
generally suffers, however, from pronounced decreases in specificity in relation to little gain
in terms of sensitivity. While results look promising for emerging economies and fair for
large economies the specificity drops below 50% for the other country sets. This means that
in the conservative scenario the majority of issued warning signals would be false positives in
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return for sensitivity scores of around or above 0.90, which still means that every tenth crisis
will be missed. Figure A.8 in the appendix displays the policy maker’s trade-off between
type I and type II errors against the preference parameter φ for the pooled combined model.
It is visible that the type I error rate, i.e. issuing false positives, climbs up rapidly from
a φ value greater than 0.7 in return for only small improvements to the type II error rate.
Without imposing on the policy maker’s risk aversion and considering the importance of
avoiding false negatives, i.e. missing crises, it seems that a φ in the upper range of 0.5 to
0.75 is desirable for the pooled model.
Out-of-sample performance
A popular form of criticism towards recently developed crisis prediction models is that the
Global Financial Crisis is responsible for the bulk of crisis observations in most samples, and
that excluding this event would result in a severe loss of general validity. In this section, I
present results of two out-of-sample evaluation exercises that underline the usefulness of the
models I propose not only as a backward-looking explanation of crisis incidence but also as
a forward-looking early-warning model of banking crises. First, I conduct cross-validation
over the pooled sample and, second, I employ a recursive assessment of all three models in
which the three models are continuously re-estimated for every subsequent observation in
time.
Cross-validation is a systematic assessment technique of a model’s out-of-sample per-
formance. The pooled sample is randomly split into k = 5 parts of equal size (same number
of observations), called folds.19 k − 1 folds comprise the training data, while the randomly
selected k’th fold serves as the testing data, and is, thus, not used for the model’s estima-
tion but for its validation. All k possible combinations of training and testing datasets are
19 I choose k = 5 because it is in the range of commonly used number of folds and is large enough to ensure
the presence of sufficient crisis observations in the training set for the model to be estimated properly. I
experiment with other values for k but they do not change the generally positive outcome of the validation
process.
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then individually estimated and evaluated. Due to the randomization, the resulting AUROC
measures become themselves stochastic. The cross-validation is then repeated n = 10 times
to give a more arithmetically averaged picture of the out-of-sample predictive ability of this
study’s dataset.
Table 7 shows the results of the cross-validation exercise. Most importantly, the AUROC
estimators are all greater than 0.5 at statistical significance. Thus, they have general pre-
dictive power out-of-sample. The exposure-based model performs out-of-sample worse than
its in-sample counterpart, which is not surprising. Encouragingly, the domestic model’s
cross-validated AUROC is not different than its in-sample estimate at 99.8% confidence.
The cross-validated combined model is statistically different from its in-sample counterpart
only at 83.6% confidence. Also its estimate of 0.835 is not much lower than its in-sample
counterpart. In summary, the combined model does not fare much worse—and at 16.4%
confidence even equally as good—out-of-sample as it does in-sample, which is an extraordi-
nary result and evidence of its general applicability.20 Lastly, the combined out-of-sample
performance is statistically greater than the domestic estimation, reconfirming the relevance
of the cross-border lending channel.
The recursive exercise begins in the fourth quarter of 2004, as it is the earliest possible
date for which sufficient balanced panel data is available for all country subsets and for
which the estimation algorithm of the logistic regression model converges. I continuously re-
estimate all three models for each successive quarter up until the end of data coverage in the
third quarter of 2018. By computing the model predictions subsequently with information
that is known at each respective time point alone, I prevent a look-ahead bias. Starting in
2004 means that the first recursive model estimation already factors in a number of crisis
observations, for instance the Japanese crisis or the Scandinavian crises in the early 1990s.
Again, I separate between small, large, developed, and emerging economies, and consider
20 Cross-validating a dataset naturally destroys the relevance of the data’s time dimension due to random
slicing. The second out-of-sample assessment using a recursive estimation accounts, however, accounts for
the chronology of observations.
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Table 7: Out-of-sample cross-validation results
Measure Model
Domestic Exposure-based Combined
AUROC mean 0.798 0.587 0.835
AUROC standard deviation 0.036 0.060 0.039
Degrees of freedom 49 49 49
Pooled I-S estimation 0.781 0.628 0.843
T-test p-values:
H0: Different from 0.5 0.000 0.000 0.000
H1: Different from I-S estimation 0.998 0.000 0.836
H2: Not Different from I-S estimation 0.002 1.000 0.164
H3: AUROC different from DM 0.000 0.000
Notes: Cross-validation is computed with k = 5, n = 10, φ = 0.5 on the pooled dataset
without including the interaction term. Including the interaction term does not alter the
results. I-S stands for in-sample. To account for non-equal variances when comparing
two samples I employ Welch’s (1947) t-tests.
a pooled dataset, as well. I compute sensitivity and specificity measures after running the
exercise for each country subset and compare their relative performances.21
Figure 6 displays the development of the estimated crisis probabilities and thresholds
over time for the combined model and for all countries with sufficient data available. It
is evident that for many countries which experienced domestic banking crises the crisis
probability rises above the threshold well before the beginning of the respective crisis, as
indicated by the shaded areas. This is an impressive result considering that it excludes
all crisis observations during the Global Financial Crisis from the training data as they
were no known at the time of the prediction. Especially, the domestic crises in Belgium,
Denmark, France, Great Britain, Ireland, Netherlands, Norway, Russia, Spain, Sweden, and
Switzerland could have been predicted out-of-sample if the model had been in place before
21 For this exercise, AUROCs cannot be used as an assessment of predictive ability. Effectively, there is no
overall threshold choice anymore over which an AUROC could be computed. Each quarter has already
been assigned its optimal threshold considering the data available at the time. The optimal threshold
value for the entire recursive exercise is thus time-varying. However, we can compute the sensitivity
and specificity based on these optimal thresholds and the respective crisis probability predictions at each
quarter.
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Figure 6: Recursive out-of-sample exercise of the combined model
South Korea Spain Sweden Switzerland United States
Netherlands New Zealand Norway Russia South Africa
Great Britain Ireland Israel Italy Japan
Chile Denmark Finland France Germany
Australia Austria Belgium Brazil Canada



























Note: The figure displays recursively estimated out-of-sample crisis probabilities and respective
time-varying thresholds for a subset of countries with sufficient data. Shaded areas represent
periods of banking crises. The combined model is estimated for small and large economies
separately without using the interaction term between the crisis-risk weighted exposure index
and the current account balance.
2008. It further succeeds in forecasting that Brazil, Canada, Chile, Finland, Israel, and South
Africa remain resilient with their predicted probabilities not—or only briefly—breaching the
threshold. Contrarily, the out-of-sample prediction of resilience would not have worked for
Australia, New Zealand, and South Korea. Lastly, the picture is a little more mixed with
the correct predictions that were less clearly above the thresholds as for Austria, Germany,
and the United States. Here the model would have nonetheless issued warning signals, but
a much clearer outcome—especially with regard to the United States as the global crisis’
epicenter—would have been preferable.
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In summary, however, the out-of-sample performance gives not only credibility to the
methodology in terms of its potential as an early-warning model, but it also makes a case
against the argument that it is only the observations of the Global Financial Crisis that drive
the good in-sample performance. Excluding this event all together would have still yielded
very good prediction results and further supports my argument of the general applicability
of the cross-border lending channel beyond the Global Financial Crisis.
Table 8: Out-of-sample recursive results
Measure Country Set
Small / Large Emerg. / Dev. All
Domestic model
Sensitivity 0.731 0.692 0.692
Specificity 0.662 0.752 0.773
Exposure-based model
Sensitivity 0.736 0.607 0.567
Specificity 0.775 0.757 0.684
Exposure-based model IT
Sensitivity 0.736 0.607 0.567
Specificity 0.775 0.757 0.684
Combined model
Sensitivity 0.800 0.731 0.273
Specificity 0.837 0.838 0.806
Combined model IT
Sensitivity 0.792 0.746 0.258
Specificity 0.850 0.792 0.737
Notes: Emerg. refers to emerging economies. Dev. refers to developed economies.
IT refers to the inclusion of the interaction term between the current account
balance and the crisis-risk weighted exposure index.
Table 8 summaries the results of the recursive exercise quantitatively by displaying the
actual sensitivity and specificity scores over the entire time span for the individual models and
country sets. One of the main findings of this paper—namely that the inclusion of exposure-
based risk from cross-border bank flows increases the predictive ability of purely domestic
37
early warning models—is reconfirmed: The combined model’s sensitivity and specificity
scores are higher than those of their domestic counterparts for the model specifications where
small and large, or emerging and developed economies, respectively, are estimated separately.
Interestingly, this does not hold for the pooled approach. Here, the recursive exercise lets
the sensitivity collapse way below 0.5. The exclusion of the Global Financial Crisis for
the estimation of the majority of crisis events in the sample underlines the importance of
distinguishing between the economic characteristics of the countries in question.
Summarizing the results from both exercises, a clear picture emerges: The model ar-
guably has predictive power out-of-sample and qualifies for application in a policy setting.
Although the majority of crisis observations in the sample occur during the Global Financial
Crisis, the proposed combined model still produces very satisfactory prediction results with
sensitivity and specificity scores around or above 0.8 if trained recursively. Similarly, the
exposure-based model exhibits scores (well) above 0.6, indicating predictive power. This
supports the notion that it is not just the recent major crisis event that enables the cross
border lending channel in the model, but that it is a general phenomenon that was at work
before.
V. The Global Financial Crisis
We saw that accounting for foreign-induced crisis risk originating from cross-border bank
claims improves the performance of a model that considers domestic risks alone. Now, I
turn back to the puzzle of crisis incidence during the Global Financial Crisis that I laid out
in the introduction. Figure 7 shows the in-sample performance of the three models from a
perspective of issued warning signals between the first quarter of 2006 and the first quarter
of 2013. Lime green boxes stand for true positive predictions (as subsequently determined)
and dark green ones for true negatives in the respective quarter. False negatives (missed
crises) are assumed to be more costly than false positives (erroneous warnings) and are thus
colored in red while false positives are represented in orange. The dark blue boxes indicate
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actual crisis periods while the light blue stands for the gap between the beginning of a crisis
and the lower bound of the pre-crisis horizon (i.e. three quarters) where predictions are too
close time-wise to the subsequent event to be useful for the policy maker. However, in none
of the cases presented did it occur that a signal would only be issued one or two quarters
ahead of a crisis event. Lastly, grey boxes indicate the absence of data.
We observe that the domestic model is unable to explain crisis incidence in Italy and
German, while the exposure-based model fails to predict distress in Hungary and Greece.
The domestic model further issues false warnings for South Africa, New Zealand, Finland,
and Australia. This is an expected outcome, as all these countries experienced a significant
built-up of private credit and house prices in the years preceding the Global Financial Crisis,
inducing expectations of domestic imbalances and a Minskyan boom.22. However, none of
these countries actually experienced a banking crisis. The key to why this may have been the
case, lies in the results of the exposure-based model for these economies: With the exception
of Finland, the model signals low exposure to high-risk banking systems abroad and, thus,
consequently issues no warning signal, resulting in true negatives. For Finland, however, the
proposed model does not work.
Now, combing domestic imbalances with exposure-based risk from cross-border lending
yields a much better picture: The combined model predicts crisis incidence perfectly, if we
consider, in the case of Italy, four consecutive quarters of warning signals as a sufficient in-
dication of impending crisis.23 Also, the combined model correctly issues warning signals for
Germany: The country experienced negative real house price growth and no significant built-
up of private credit, but, nonetheless, a severe banking crisis developed from banks’ exposure
to British and American liabilities, i.e. subprime mortgages. In predicting resilience, the
combined model is a little weaker as it would have falsely issued consistent warning signals
22 Source: https://stats.bis.org/statx/srs/table/h2 and https://stats.bis.org/statx/srs/
table/j?m=C, accessed June 2020.
23 The case of Italy is somewhat special: Baron & Dieckelmann (2020) argue that contrary to the assessment
of Laeven & Valencia (2018), Italy’s banking crisis did not start until 2010, as its banking system was
initially not heavily impacted through its exposure to foreign liabilities in high-risk countries, but later
because of its massive holdings of sovereign bonds of southern European countries threatened by default.
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for South Korea, South Africa, Japan, and Finland. The important take away is, however,
that even though the incidence of resilience may not have been conclusively addressed, the
incidence of banking crisis can be explained by the combination of the domestic and the
exposure-based channel.
In summary, large exposure to highly leveraged foreign banking systems is the missing
puzzle piece in the Minskyan narrative of the Global Financial Crisis. The combination of
the two sources of financial instability together explain crisis incidence perfectly within the
sample of this study. Conversely, low asset-side exposure on the balance sheets of domestic
banks seem to have been a major factor in explaining the resilience of many, often highly-
leveraged economies, outside of Europe and the United States.
VI. Conclusion
This paper contributed to the literature threefold. First, it introduces and provides evi-
dence for a new channel of international banking crisis transmission working through banks’
cross-border asset-side exposure. Sizable cross-border bank claims on foreign countries with
high probability of domestic systemic risk function as a channel of contagion to the home
economy. The cross-border bank lending channel stands in contrast to traditional views
that see banking crises either as a result of domestic boom-bust dynamics or of cross-border
borrowing in foreign currency. Second, I present a significantly improved early-warning tech-
nique to capture both domestic and foreign-induced risk of banking crisis, that incorporates
the exposure to at-risk foreign banking systems in a network setting. The presented model
outperforms traditional approaches that consider purely domestic risks considerably, both
in and out-of-sample. Third, this study provides evidence that the proposed channel is de-
pendent on the level of financial development. While it is active and highly predictive of
banking crisss in developed countries, no evidence can be found for its effectiveness in emerg-
ing economies. Here, the classical cross-border borrowing narrative applies. The inclusion of
the international bank lending channel in an early warning setting, as also recently proposed
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by Aldasoro et al. (2018) and Lang (2018), stands in contrast to the established notion of
international borrowing as an external source of financial instability that is well known from
the currency crisis and external debt crisis literatures (Frankel & Rose, 1996; Reinhart et al.,
1998; Reinhart & Rogoff, 2009)
The early-warning system in this study combines into a single system a domestic model—
which uses standard multivariate logistic regressions with a binary banking crisis classifier
as dependent variable and a set of macro-financial indicators as independent variables—with
an exposure-based model—which employs a weighted sum of domestic crisis probabilities in
foreign countries on which the home economy has bank claims. As weights, I use the volume
of the home country’s cross-border asset-side exposure in relation to the size of its economy.
The model is set up in such a way that it issues warning signals in a pre-crisis period of 3 to
12 quarters before a predicted banking crisis to allow for the policy maker to apply counter
measures.
As mentioned in the introduction, the incidence of banking crises in countries around
the globe poses a puzzle to macro-finance and the banking crisis literature. The prevalent
narratives of Minskyan boom-bust cycles or contagion through borrowing can not explain
why highly leveraged economies like Australia and New Zealand were not affected, while
low-risk economies like Germany and Switzerland were. A first of four major findings solves
this puzzle: Including domestic banks’ asset-side exposure to foreign banking systems in
high-risk countries into a model of domestic imbalances explains crisis incidence. During the
Global Financial Crisis economies with low cross-border exposure proved resilient towards the
incidence of systemic banking crises. Although these countries may have exhibited domestic
imbalances, like in the case of Australia, the low exposure shielded them from spill-overs from
the United States, the United Kingdom, and other adversely affected economies. Conversely,
economies without large domestic imbalances, like Switzerland or Germany, still suffered
from banking crises as their international exposure made them vulnerable to the imbalances
within foreign banking systems. Overall, small open economies with low exposure to high-
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risk economies, such as Australia, Canada, Israel, Finland, and New Zealand, were spared
from the effects of the Global Financial Crisis through the cross-border banking channel.24
A second major finding of this study is that the relevance of the lending channel increases
with financial development. The channel is relevant only for developed banking systems,
while the borrowing channel remains relevant for less developed banking systems. I reckon
that this may have to do with insufficient domestic saving levels in emerging economies that
result in funds being allocated through banks at home rather than abroad. Various forms
of financial repression or a higher rate of return from domestic lending than from foreign
lending may also play a role.
In a third finding, the paper addresses why the current account has hitherto been such a
unreliable predictor of banking crisis. While the currency crisis literature finds that current
account deficits precede financial crises, the evidence for general banking crises is mixed
at best (Frankel & Saravelos, 2012; Kauko, 2014). The results in this study show that for
emerging economies, a current account deficit is predictive of banking crises, while for smaller
developed economies a surplus tends to be predictive. This disparity seems convincing if one
considers that the typical victims of currency crises are emerging economies.
Fourth and last, the functioning of the cross-border lending channel is independent
of the current account balance, except for emerging economies. For developed economies,
outward bank flows are predictive of financial instability regardless of the direction of net
capital flows. For emerging economies, the situation is reversed. I conclude that looking
at net flows alone is not sufficient to grasp the full picture of potential external sources of
instability. Bank lending can induce financial instability in financially developed economies
irrespective of the size and direction of other types of financial flows.25
I recognize several avenues for future research. Using the asset-side of the Locational
Banking Statistics for all countries in the sample would enhance the accuracy of the cross-
24 Naturally, these economies were still affected in the aftermath by the global collapse in confidence, trade
and resource prices.
25 Which is not to say that these flows may pose their own dangers to financial instability. Their assessment,
however, is beyond the scope of this paper.
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border exposure measures. For this, more nations would have to start reporting their data
to the BIS. Also, prolonging quarterly data on house prices and on the current account and
for several countries with limited coverage would give a more complete picture of the factors
that made the difference in crisis incidence during the recent crisis. Adding more emerging
economies to the sample would bring down the standard errors in the regression coefficient
estimates and provide a more complete picture on the channel and its relationship with
financial development. In the same vain, it may be interesting to set-up an exposure-based
model from the liability side to test the workings of the cross-border borrowing channel. Last,
investigating in how far the cross-border bank lending channel has been active historically
would add greatly to its consideration in the literature but may be challenging because of
the current lack of historical cross-border bank data.
The findings of this paper are particularly valuable for policy makers in developed
economies. Macroprudential units should monitor the built-up of domestic imbalances in
foreign countries that their own country has financial ties with. Large amounts of outstand-
ing cross-border bank claims in relation to the home country’s GDP against foreign countries
with elevated risk of banking crises can become disastrous even regardless of the conditions
at home. The early warning system proposed in this paper constitutes a significant improve-
ment over conventional early warning systems that focus solely on the domestic channel
of banking crises, and represents a valuable contribution that will greatly enhance policy
makers’ capabilities and that will help preventing financial catastrophes in the future.
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Note: Displayed above are marginal effects of the combined model, computed for the separate
country sets including the interaction term between the exposure index and the current account
balance. All observations of each explanatory variable are standardized to a mean of 0 and a stan-
dard deviation of 1 to ensure comparability of the marginal effects. Thus, the displayed marginal
effects are the expected change in crisis probability in response to a one-standard deviation shock
to the respective variable. It is visible from the plots that for all country sets except for emerging
economies the exposure index adds positively and significantly to a higher probability of banking
crisis. For emerging economies, the effect’s standard errors are large and contain the zero, from
which no positive effect on financial instability can be derived. This corroborates the study’s find-
ing that the cross-border lending channel of banking crisis transmission is not active for emerging
economies. For all other country sets its contribution to probability is substantial, positive, and
significantly above zero, which means that the inclusion of the exposure index is the factor that
increases the AUROC in comparison to the domestic model. The slight increase of the combined






























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Crisis risk-weighted exposure index 0.310∗∗∗ 0.022
(0.026) (0.110)
Private debt-to-GDP ratio 0.003∗∗ 0.0003
(0.001) (0.001)
Exposure index * private debt ratio 0.002∗∗∗
(0.001)
Observations 4,512 4,512
Log Likelihood −1,014.249 −1,010.242
Akaike Inf. Crit. 2,034.498 2,028.484
Notes: *, **, *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% confidence level,
respectively. Depicted are the estimations of two augmented exposure-based model
specifications over the pooled sample including the private debt-to-GDP ratio as a
proxy for financial development (King & Levine, 1993; Ang, 2008). The interaction
term between the exposure index and the private debt-to-GDP ratio assumes the entire
significance of both conventional coefficients when included: The exposure index’s
predictive power of banking crises is positively dependent on financial development.
Its independent contribution is insignificant.
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